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In a radio broadcast before World War II, Orson Welles almost
literally  turned  the  United  States upside  down  by announcing  an
invasion  from  Mars.  This  has  been  a  crisis  society  ever  since.
Some  of the crises,  such as those involved in World War II, have
been  all  too  real.  Some,  like  the  Orson  Welles  broadcast,  were
thoroughly artificial. Our present energy crisis is an unusually com-
plicated  mixture  of both.  I  shall  attempt  to  place  the  issues  in
some  kind of perspective.
Here are  the questions  I want to raise:
First, economists  believe that the price system tends to operate
as  a fever thermometer  in identifying crises  as  well  as a  curative
device  in its own  right. If so,  to what extent is the present  energy
crisis  a product  of the  malfunctioning  of the  price  system?  And
to what extent can the energy crisis be alleviated, if not eliminated,
by  a better performance  from this same  price system?
Second,  to what extent  is our approach  to the present energy
crisis muddled by our failure to distinguish between short-run prob-
lems  and long-run problems?
Third,  to  what  extent  is  the  crisis  due  to  our obtaining  most
of our energy sources  from so-called "wasting  assets"  rather than
from renewable  resources  such  as those  produced  by  our  farms
and forests?
Fourth,  to  what extent  is  the  crisis  psychological,  occurring
in  our minds  rather than  in the external world,  either because  we
have just  awakened  to what  has  been  true  all  along,  or because
we think we have  awakened to what  has been  false all along-and
still is?
Fifth,  to  what  extent  is  the  crisis  essentially  a feature  of our
adjustment  to international politics  rather than to our energy posi-
tion?
These  five questions  are  only a sampling of those  which  could
be  raised  in  connection  with  the  energy  crisis.  But  they  should
be sufficient to introduce some of the economic problems involved.
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The outstanding  example  of what  the  price  system has done
with respect to the energy crisis-in contrast to what it might have
done-is provided  by the  history  of prices,  investment,  and  pro-
duction  with respect  to  oil  and natural  gas  since  the  mid-1930's,
and  more  particularly  since  the  end  of World War  II. The story
reminds  one  of the  hare  and  the tortoise:  The  hare took  a  com-
manding lead, decided to rest awhile before completing his obvious
victory,  and  then  woke  up  to  find  himself irretrievably  behind.
The  situation  is  similar  for  our hare-brained  oil  and  gas  policy.
Let us  begin with the recital of certain economic  relationships
between  oil and gas.
Oil and Gas-The Supply  Side
Historically,  crude  oil  has  had  a  much  greater  total  value  at
the  wellhead  than  natural  gas.  This  has  been  the  result  of two
different  factors:  more  calories  of crude  oil  were  produced,  year
by year, in the United States,  and each calorie  had a considerably
higher  value  than  its  heat  equivalent  in natural  gas.  Try  running
your  automobile  on  natural  gas-which  is,  by  the  way,  entirely
possible-and you will  immediately  understand  a major source of
the oil advantage.
Geologically,  the relationship between oil and natural gas tends
to  be  both  close  and  complex.  About  half the  natural  gas  wells
discovered in the United States are discovered by wildcatters  who
are looking for oil;  conversely,  a small percentage of the oil wells
are discovered  by  wildcatters  who are  looking for natural  gas.  A
substantial,  though  not major,  share  of the  natural  gas  produced
in  the  United  States  is  so-called  "associated"  natural  gas,  pro-
duced from wells which also produce  oil. Moreover,  an important
share  of oil output in the United  States derives  from  "gas drive"
oil fields-that  is,  from  fields in which  oil is forced  to  the surface
by pressure from underground  natural gas  deposits.
Oil and Gas-The Demand  Side
As if these  supply-side interrelationships  were not enough,  oil
and natural gas also tend to be Siamese twins on the demand  side.
The  most  obvious  use  for  which natural  gas  is  not a perfect
substitute for oil is transportation. This obvious use is very impor-
tant,  because  gasoline  alone  typically  provides  about  one-half of
all oil refinery  revenues.  But, for  practically every  use of natural
gas,  oil  provides  what  used  to  be  considered  an  almost  perfect
substitute.  Electric power plants  in Texas bum natural  gas,  while
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choice  of fuels  has  in  the  past  been  determined  almost  entirely
by  relative  prices.  Something  very  important  has been  added  to
this case of pure  substitution in the  very  recent past. That  some-
thing  is,  of course,  the  antipollution  campaign,  and  the laws  and
ordinances  it has produced. Thus, crude oil and its products,  which
used  to compete  with natural  gas for almost every use  of natural
gas, now compete much less effectively  for some uses and in some
locations.
Oil and natural  gas are  individually  so important, and so inter-
woven  in  technical  and  economic  relationships  all  the  way  from
initial  geological  exploration  to  final  consumption,  that there  can
be  no  rational  separation  of the  economics  of crude  oil,  or  pe-
troleum  products,  and the economics  of natural  gas.
Irrational Policies?
This  brings  us  to  the  irrationality  of our  national  economic
policies  with respect  to oil and natural gas over the last thirty-five
or forty years.
The  first  form of irrationality  is the  fact that  we  have  had  no
policy which could legitimately  be described  as "national"  for oil.
The first  national  legislation  relative  to  oil,  passed  in  the  1930's,
was  designed  to  support  state regulation  by  preventing  oil  pro-
duced  in  violation  of state  laws  from moving  into  interstate  com-
merce.  Direct national action was  deferred until  1958,  when com-
pulsory  quotas  on  oil  imports  were  introduced.  But  even  these
mandatory  quotas  could  scarcely  be  described  as  a policy,  or  as
the result  of a policy.  Instead  they  were  the  result of the failure
of a policy.  Federal  aid had to be called  in because  state controls
alone  were  not  achieving  the  results  that  U.S.  oil  producers
wanted.
Second,  natural  gas  regulation  has  been  only  partial at  the
national or federal level.  The Federal Power Commission has had
the  right  to  regulate  the  rates  of interstate  natural  gas  pipelines
since  the  1930's,  and  was  required  by  the  Supreme  Court  to  set
wellhead  prices  on  natural gas  moving  in interstate  commerce  by
the Phillips decision in  1954.  But Texas is a big state: in geographic
terms,  in terms of natural  gas  production,  in terms of natural  gas
consumption.  Texas  output consumed  within the state  is not sub-
ject to price control by the Federal Power Commission.  The same
situation prevails,  on a  lesser scale,  in other  producing states.
Therefore,  with respect  to the governmental status concerning
oil and  natural  gas  policy,  two  things  must  be  said:  The  federal
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enforce  such  a  policy  on  a  nationwide  basis;  and  this  inability
has been  much  more pronounced,  and  much more  important,  for
oil than for natural  gas.
The third irrationality is the economic consequence of this legal
and political  situation. The  thrust of state regulation,  with special
reference  to Texas,  has  been  to  assure  satisfactory  oil  prices  by
the  maintenance  of  minimum  prices  for  crude  oil  through  the
enforcement  of "maximum  allowables"-that  is,  by an  elaborate
quota system for holding down the output of each producing well.
The  thrust  of federal  regulation  of natural  gas  prices  has  been
to check rising prices through the enforcement of maximum prices.
Any economist would expect a minimum price policy that main-
tains  satisfactory  prices  to  produce  a  surplus  of both  actual  oil
wells and potential oil output.  He would also expect price ceilings
for  natural  gas  either  to  produce  a  deficit  of  supply  relative  to
demand,  or diversion of natural gas from regulated interstate  mar-
kets  to  unregulated  intrastate  markets,  or both. These  economic
expectations were fully realized  with respect  to oil until about two
years  ago,  and  with respect  to natural  gas  for about  the last two
years.  In short,  we  have  gone  from a surplus of oil to  a deficit of
natural  gas.  And,  to make  matters worse,  the former contributed
to  the latter.
Oil exploration  and  drilling  slumped  all through  the  1960's  as
output  from  existing  wells  was  cut  back  sharply  in  an  attempt
to maintain minimum crude  oil prices.  The  cutback in oil explora-
tion  and  drilling  also  automatically  entailed  future  cutbacks  in
natural gas  production.  Of course, output controls  brought higher
prices  than  would  have  prevailed  without  them,  but  they  also
encouraged  less efficient drilling and production methods.  Perhaps
more  important,  they  produced  an  apparent  surplus  which,  like
the hare's early lead  over the tortoise,  was  conducive  to  slumber
and not to rational planning.
Finally,  our  various  policies  with  respect  to  oil  and  natural
gas have been designed,  in a number of ways,  to stimulate  present
consumption  of domestic  supplies.  Both  oil  and  natural  gas  are
exhaustible  resources.  Their main use  is in combustion,  and they
can be burned only once.  Yet, as a glance at the map of Minnesota
would  indicate,  we  have  paid  far  more  attention  to  conservation
of the renewable resource  of our  timber  than  to  the  exhaustible
resource  of our  hydrocarbons.  This  is  as  if a  householder  went
to  work  to  destroy  all  his  heirlooms,  and  at  the  same  time  took
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mail order catalogue.
We  may  conclude,  then,  by  saying  that  the  price  system  has
never  had  a  chance  to operate  unimpeded,  in either  diagnosing
or helping to cure our energy problems.  As manipulated  by  differ-
ent  governmental  units  with  different  objectives,  its  operations
provide  an  economic  demonstration  of Lincoln's  dictum  that  no
nation  can exist half slave and half free.
II. THE SHORT RUN AND  THE LONG
The  hare  and tortoise  story  is  still useful  here.  The  hare  had
the  attributes  and  abilities  of a  sprinter;  his  major  error  was  to
confuse  the tactics of a dash  with the tactics  of a marathon.
We  need  to  shift  from  generalizations  to  the  specifics  of the
energy  crisis.  No  one  has yet found  a way  to  push the  short-run
phenomenon  of the  coming  winter  into  the  remote  future.  The
only  way  to escape  the  seasons  is  to  move  to  the  tropics.  This
obvious point provides  a devastating criticism of the kind of energy
programs  that have been  emanating  from high places  in Washing-
ton and elsewhere.
In  terms  of timing,  the  easiest  part  of the  energy  crisis  has
to  do  with  present  deficiencies  in  oil-refining  capacity.  Past high
profit margins on production of U.S.  crude oil tended,  inevitably,
to create pressure toward low profit margins at the refinery.  There-
fore,  investment  in new refining  capacity did not have  the normal
profit  incentives-quite  apart  from  environmental  problems,  and
uncertainties  with  respect  to  import  policy.  Replacement  and
expansion  of refining capacity,  unlike  replacement  and  expansion
of oil reserves,  is  simply a matter of obtaining the requisite  skilled
labor and specialized equipment-and  waiting long enough for the
refinery  construction  to be  completed.  Yet the immediate  part of
the  oil  element  in  our  energy  crisis  is  so  immediate  that  it  will
not even  wait for the completion  of new  refineries.
On  the  other  hand,  the  long-run  problem  of reserves  of  hy-
drocarbons  is  so  long-run that  it involves  entirely  different issues
from those  connected  with  refinery  construction.  To  treat  all  of
the components  of the energy  crisis  as  if they had  the same  time
horizons  is  not  realistic.  Indeed,  even  to  say  "energy  crisis"  is
misleading.  We  have,  instead,  a  number  of energy  problems.  If
they  are to be solved or even ameliorated,  there  must be a careful
phasing in  time of properly articulated  programs.  Greater incen-
tives  to  drill  for  oil  and  natural  gas  are  not  going  to  raise  this
winter's temperatures  in  Brainerd,  Minnesota,  by a single degree.
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We have already noted what seems to be the paradox of Ameri-
can  conservation  policy:  We  seem to be more  concerned  with the
preservation  of renewable  resources,  such  as trees,  than with the
preservation  of nonrenewable  resources,  such  as  oil  and  natural
gas.
This  apparent  paradox  can,  of course,  be  turned  completely
around:  Why  worry  about  the  conservation  of resources  which
must  eventually  be  exhausted  anyway?  Is  it  not  more  sensible
to  devote  attention  to  resources  which  can  be  renewed  with
appropriate  planning  but cannot  be  renewed  without  such  plan-
ning?
Moreover,  the renewable  versus nonrenewable  paradox  is  not
in  its  most extreme  form when  we  compare  oil  and  gas,  on  the
one hand, with forests,  on the other. The days of primary  reliance
on wood for fuel are long gone in this country. Even sawmill wastes
increasingly  find alternative  uses.  The  most interesting  questions
of conservation of resources,  whether renewable or nonrenewable,
arise  from comparisons  of products  which  are  directly  related  in
consumer markets.
Even with  these qualifications,  the period  since  the beginning
of  the  nineteenth  century  has  been  the  Age  of  Fossil  Fuels.
Resources which took hundreds of millions of years to accumulate
are  being  used  up  in  decades.  And  the  rate  of consumption  of
some  of  the  most  important  of  these  resources  continues  to
increase  in geometric  progression.
Nuclear  power,  which  has  seemed  at times  to  offer  the  key
to  open  the  gateway  into  true  energy  abundance,  is  not without
problems  of its  own.  Most  nuclear  power  plants  being  installed
around  the  world  today  are  of  a  general  type,  which  has  been
more  or less  standardized  for a  decade  if not  for two.  But,  even
after due allowance for general inflation,  the cost of building these
nuclear plants  has risen in  spite of advance  assurances  from qual-
ified  experts  that  it  would  drop.  Moreover,  the  nuclear  fuel  on
which the  industry depends  is not  inexhaustible.  Breeder reactors
which  will vastly  expand the practical  availability of such fuel are
still in a very experimental stage.  They involve technical and scien-
tific problems  which are considerably  more serious than those con-
nected  with  present  reactors  even  in  their  infancy  twenty  years
ago.  And  as  for opening  the  sluice gates  to oceans  of energy  via
nuclear  fusion,  a  controlled  fusion  is  still  being  attempted  in  the
laboratories,  with no indication of when-or if-fusion will become
commercially  feasible.
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energy  area,  we  have  been  living  on  our capital  for a  long  time
now.  In the rest of the world,  populations are  increasing,  or living
standards  are  rising,  or  both.  Each  of  these  factors,  taken
separately,  is  a  source  of  massive  new  energy  demands.  So,
although  the  United  States  or  any  one  other  country  may  hope
to alleviate its future energy needs by imports, a world-wide energy
shortage obviously cannot  be solved  by  imports.
Once  all  of these  pessimistic  comments  are  made,  it  should
be  added  that neither the  amount nor the type  of energy demand
is  something  determined  immutably  by  the  size  of  a  country's
population  or the level of national income.  This has become  most
evident in the United States, in recent years, not only in the discus-
sion  of the  feasibility  of automobiles  which  yield  more  miles  to
the gallon, but also  in a decided  shift  in public preferences  toward
such more economical  cars.
Looking  beyond  this  obvious  case,  one notes  that most  U.S.
energy  consumption  is  by  industrial  and  commercial  users,  not
by  private  automobiles  or  households.  Even  natural  gas,  which
is  often  considered  primarily  a  high-grade  source  of  residential
heating,  is  mainly  used  for  fueling  electric  power  plants  and  for
industrial purposes.
In  the industrial  sphere,  two  trends have  been  evident  in the
U.S.  economy for a long  time.  One  is  the trend toward  a smaller
relative  share  of  goods  or  commodities  and  more  services  in
national  output.  Also,  technology  is  reducing  the  size  of heavy
and  bulky  commodities.  Compare,  for  example,  a  newest-
generation  computer  with the huge  installations  used  at the  dawn
of the  industry;  and compare  these,  in  turn,  with the  adding and
calculating machines  which would  have been  required to  perform
similar  functions  pre-computer.  Services  tend  to  win  out  over
goods,  and  commercial  services  tend  to  win  out  over  domestic
services.
The second trend,  which reinforces  the first,  is for the smaller,
lighter, and more flexible to replace the bulkier, heavier,  and more
cumbersome-and  for both  to  be  produced  with greater  fuel effi-
ciency.  A  ton of steel  now  requires  much  less  coke  than  it  did
even  a  few  years  ago,  and  the  same  is  true  for  the  electricity
required to produce  a pound of aluminum.  In industry after indus-
try, efficiency  gains have meant cuts in energy consumption, even
before  the  appearance  of the  incentive  of  higher  energy  prices
which  has  been  so  conspicuously  present  in  the  last  few  years.
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hand,  this-but  on  the  other  hand,  that."  In  order  to  continue
beyond this  level of balanced  platitudes,  it  is  necessary  to return
temporarily  to  the  previous  section  in  order  to  reintroduce  the
idea of timing.  Once  the  clock  is  brought  into  the  problem,  we
have  brand  new  meanings  for  our  "one  hand  and  other hand."
Energy  demands  tend to increase  regularly  and  quite steadily,
so that their growth  can be approximated  by a simple percentage.
Methods  of economizing  energy  also tend  to appear  more  or less
continuously;  however, they are not adequate to offset the growth
in demand.
In  our  present  economy,  increasing  supplies  of  energy  will
depend  to  an  unusual  degree  on  the  presence  or  absence  of
irregular, discontinuous  scientific and technical breakthroughs.  By
their very nature, these breakthroughs  are not likely to come along
in  predictable  magnitude  or  in  predictable  order.  They  may  not
come  along  at  all.  If they  do,  it  is  likely  to  be  only  as  a  result
of massive  and  continuing  expenditure  on  all  levels  of research,
and on  all types of pilot plants.  There  may be no need for a crash
program  of the  type  developed  to  produce  the  atom  bomb.  But
there is clearly a need for a massive, government-financed  research
effort-preferably  in  cooperation  with  such  efforts  in  other
countries,  on  a  scale  considerably  larger  than  that of the  space
program.
Even a massive program may not produce massive results when
shortages  develop.  No  matter  what  the  remote  future  may  hold,
the  banquet  in  the  king's  palace  does  no  good  for  the  man  who
has  starved  along  the way.  Therefore,  there  is  a unique  need  in
the energy  area for long-range contingency planning which  would
do  for  energy  what  the  armed  forces  attempt  to  do for  national
security.  Such  planning  involves,  as  a  minimum,  unified  and
affirmative  supervision  (not just  the  regulatory  kind  which  has
dominated until now),  with a much greater  infusion of governmen-
tal  funds  and  a  much  greater  attention  to  timing  than  we  have
seen  so far.
IV.  ENERGY  AND  THE PSYCHOLOGICAL  CRISIS
The heading of this section is deliberately chosen  to emphasize
the fact that part of the present  "energy  crisis"  derives,  not from
anything  that  has  happened  directly  to  the  supply  of or demand
for energy,  but  from what might  be  described  as a  change  in  our
society's demands  on itself.
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Of all  the  changes  that  have  impinged  on energy  markets  in
the  last  decade,  the  most  rapid  as  well  as  the  most unexpected
and the  most unpredictable  have  emerged  as by-products  of "the
ecology  movement."  This  movement  has  already  resulted  in
important  legislation  as well  as  in less tangible  changes  in  public
attitudes.  And,  in turn,  it  has emerged  as a  submovement  within
a more  general  crisis in the American  public's  view of itself.  The
traditional  staple  of Fourth  of July  oratory  was,  "My  country!
May  she  always  be in the  right;  but my country,  right or wrong."
The late  1960's  might be described  as the period of "My country!
Therefore  it is always  in the wrong!"
This attitude has already  been a factor  in numerous  social and
political  changes-directly,  or by  reaction.  In  the energy  sphere,
the  ecological army  has  already  won  a number of significant  vic-
tories,  and  in  the  process  has  directed  public  attention  both  to
the  fall-out-literal  and  figurative-from  energy  use,  and  to  the
fact  that  under modern  urban  conditions  this  fall-out  is  likely  to
be of negative value.  Forty years ago the production of electricity
was  viewed  as  an  eminently  praiseworthy  activity  deserving  of
stimulation  in  all  its  forms.  Today  the  past  enthusiasm  for  new
generating plants  or new transmission  lines has  been  replaced  by
attacks  on  the  patriotism  of those  who  use  electric  can  openers
or  by  comparisons  tending  to  denigrate  the wants  of the  human
population  relative  to the wants of the fish population.
So  far,  the environmental  movement  has  not  become  mature
enough to forsake a tendency toward an all-or-none approach. This
shows itself in several ways.  One  is impatience,  which is  a typical
sign  either  of lack  of historical  perspective  or of  an  inferiority
complex which is related to the subconscious  view that bad recom-
mendations  must  be  enacted  immediately  precisely  because  they
are  bad  recommendations.  A  second  is  a  tendency  to  prohibit,
but not  price  or  tax.  Despite  the  American  experience  with  the
prohibition  of the  manufacture  and  sale  of alcoholic  beverages,
we  still seem  to  regard  the  death penalty  as  the proper  treatment
for  social  ills  if not for  individual  crimes.  A  third  is  a tendency,
again reminiscent of the Anti-Saloon League,  to assume that "pol-
luters"  are  not only antisocial  but  immoral.  As  environmentalism
matures,  those phases  of the energy  crisis  which  have  been  con-
ferred on  it  by  the  environmentalists  should  become  more  ame-
nable  to economic  treatment.
Meanwhile,  it  is  imperative  to  pinpoint just what the  problem
is  and  how  it  may  be  attacked  without  making  the  cure  worse
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try, or concentrate  it all in one place? Should we freeze all pollution
at its present level? Does it make sense to require the same antipol-
lution  devices  on  the  automobile  of  a  farmer  in  central  North
Dakota  as  on the third  car owned  by  a resident  of Los  Angeles?
The problem of meshing energy needs with environmental  require-
ments  is  already  difficult.  It will  become  more  difficult.  Without
the clearest  possible  thinking  about environmental  requirements,
it becomes  impossible.
V.  THE END OF ECONOMIC  ISOLATION
Until very recent times, the United States has had a remarkable
degree  of economic  self-sufficiency.  This  was  largely  the  result
of the interaction of geography and technology  rather than national
policy.  Anyone  willing  to  give  up  drinking  coffee  and  tea,  and
eating chocolate  and  bananas,  could  spend  a  long  and  happy life
on a strict  basis of Buy  American.
Our historical record of a very low ratio of exports and imports
to national income is already disappearing into the past. Estimates
for the  future  are  that  oil,  which  was  on  an  export  basis  before
World  War  II,  will  constitute  by  far  our  leading  import  in just
a  few  years.  With  the  introduction  of new  technologies  and  new
equipment,  ocean  shipment  of liquefied  natural  gas  has  added  a
further  important  source  of  imports.  Various  Middle  Eastern
countries  have  already  shown  by  their  actions  that  they  follow
the U.S. trade returns  as carefully as American  officials  do. Some
of these  countries  have  indicated  a  keen  interest  in  converting
part  of  their  supply  of  exportable  hydrocarbons  into  political
demands.
I  would  not  venture  to  predict  how  far  these  demands  will
go,  or what  form  they  will take.  I  would  like,  however,  to  make
two comments  about the world  energy  situation.
The  first  is  that  there  is  no  case  in  world  history  of  such  a
discrepancy  between  price  and  unit cost  as that now to  be found
with  respect  to  Middle  Eastern  oil.  As  far  as  the  Middle  East
is concerned,  the "energy crisis"  is not only political in its possible
consequences;  it is also political in its origins. When the incremen-
tal production  cost of a product lies between ten and twenty cents
per  barrel,  and  its  sales  price  ranges  from  ten  to  twenty  times
as  much,  that  product  is  neither  the  source  nor  the  measure  of
a world  energy crisis;  instead,  it is  the barometer  which registers
shifts  in world  political pressures.
My  second  comment  is  that  the  best  policy  for  the  United
29States might be the paradoxical  one of encouraging the maximum
penetration  of the  maximum  number  of oil-producing  countries
into  the  American  market.  Once  foreign  producers  gain  strong
positions  in  the  American  market,  both  economic  and  political
stability  may  be  approached  by  the  time-honored  method  of the
balance of power.
But, whatever  the specific  recipe for U.S.  action in the Brave
New  Energy  World,  we  must  first of all  face  the  fact  that  it  is,
indeed,  a world  and no longer a single country. We are all becom-
ing oil diplomats,  whether  we like it or not.
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